Historical trends of human rights gone criminal by Pinto, Mattia
1 
Historical Trends of Human Rights Gone Criminal 
Mattia Pinto 
ABSTRACT 
While the traditional understanding of human rights is to restrain state authority to prevent abuses 
against the individual, in the last few decades human rights have been recast in a way that has made 
criminal law one of the main instruments for their promotion. The article explores how, since the 
1970s, human rights have allowed penal power to move and expand around the globe. Five trends 
are explored: i) the rise of victims’ rights in criminal proceedings; ii) the emergence of United 
Nations instruments focusing on human rights enforcements by means of criminal law; iii) the 
development of transitional justice; iv) the promotion of human rights in international criminal law; 
and v) the imposition of positive duties in criminal matters by human rights bodies. The article 
argues that the universality of human rights has enabled criminal justice projects to spread and 
expand over time and space, mixing domestic and international elements. Victims’ rights advocates, 
NGOs, practitioners, academics, judges, and policymakers have been involved in this process. Yet, 
the expansion of penality by means of human rights has generally appeared as uncontroversial and 
important questions have been left unanswered. In particular, the assumptions underlying the idea 
that human rights require criminal accountability remain unexplored and unchallenged. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On 26 November 2018, Human Rights Watch filed a submission with the Argentinian prosecutors, 
calling for criminal investigations and charges against Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman, 
who was expected to attend the G20 Summit in Buenos Aires. The human rights NGO highlighted 
Bin Salman’s alleged complicity in war crimes in Yemen and in the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, the 
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Washington Post columnist killed in Istanbul’s Saudi consulate in October 2018. On 28 November, 
the Argentinean judiciary opened an investigation against the Saudi leader. Mohammed Bin Salman 
attended the summit, engaged in discussions with other world leaders, and left Argentina on 2 
December. He was not arrested but had to spend the nights at the Buenos Aires’s Saudi embassy, 
instead of in a hotel with his delegation. 
 
*** 
 
In recent years, the use of human rights to trigger the application of criminal law has proliferated 
around the world at the international, regional, and domestic levels. This process transcends national 
borders not only because of the places where proceedings are held, the nationality of the victims and 
offenders, and the location of the wrongdoings, but also because of the widespread belief that the 
universal conception of human rights mandates criminal accountability, regardless of the context, 
implications, and practicability. The case of Mohammed Bin Salman is emblematic, because it 
involves human rights violations committed in Yemen and Turkey, the alleged implication of Saudi 
nationals, a victim who was resident in the United States (US), and a complaint filed by an 
international NGO with Argentinean prosecutors. In addition, this submission was highly symbolic, 
since the likelihood that the Saudi crown prince would be arrested, prosecuted, and punished in 
Argentina was quite low. Nonetheless, as Human Rights Watch executive director Kenneth Roth 
explained, human rights require “a clear message” to be sent, that the international community is 
committed to criminal accountability for serious wrongdoings.1 This example illustrates how it has 
become normal in international, regional, and domestic law to ask that perpetrators of human rights 
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violations are held criminally accountable.2  
 This article provides a historical account of the role of human rights as drivers of penality.3 It 
explores how, since the late 1970s, domestic, regional and international courts, policymakers, and 
civil society have invoked and used human rights to justify and expand penality. Penality is justified 
directly by appeal to human rights or indirectly when it is presented as necessary for human rights 
protection. A handful of studies have examined the growing importance of criminal prosecution in 
human rights projects.4 Yet, they generally focus on specific contexts or areas of law and overlook 
wider historical trends at the domestic, regional, and international levels that have made criminal law 
an essential element of human rights protection. This article fills this gap and makes an original 
contribution to research, by outlining trends in human rights protection through criminal law 
mechanisms in a variety of geographical and institutional contexts. An effort is made to analyze the 
interaction between the international, regional, and domestic levels and explore how discourses, 
norms, and practices of one level have influenced the others. The article is divided in five parts, each 
exploring a different but inter-connected trend of using human rights in the expansion of penality. It 
begins with the growing relevance of victims’ rights in criminal proceedings. The second part shows 
the emergence of UN instruments focusing on human rights enforcement by means of criminal law 
measures. The third part deals with the enduring relevance of criminal law mechanisms in 
transitional justice projects. The fourth part presents the justificatory role of human rights in 
modern international criminal law, while the final part gives an overview on the incorporation of 
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criminal law within the work of human rights bodies. The discussion presented in this article neither 
intends to suggest that all discourses of human rights justify and strengthen penality nor aspire to be 
exhaustive. Rather, it aims to explore how human rights have historically enabled penality to expand 
while criminal law has become an opportunity for advancing the human rights project. Ultimately, 
the article illustrates how the idea that human rights require penality has circulated through time and 
space in an unchallenged fashion. The actors involved have largely accepted this phenomenon as 
normal, rather than reflect on the choices that have been made and the effects that have derived. 
The role of human rights as sources of penality has gradually been normalized.5 
II. THE RISE OF VICTIMS’ RIGHTS LANGUAGE 
Since the 1970s, the phenomenon of victims’ rights in criminal proceedings has been at the heart of 
civil rights movements’ and policymakers’ concern both on the national and the international stage.6 
While modern criminal trials have traditionally involved an exclusive relationship between the state 
and the defendant, in recent years many have argued that criminal justice should also take into 
account the interests of the parties affected by criminal wrongdoings.7 The study of victims of crime 
adopted a more practical and policy oriented perspective in the 1970s and 1980s, due to the 
combined efforts of both the women’s human rights movement and conservative, law-and-order 
 
5 MICHEL FOUCAULT, SECURITY, TERRITORY, POPULATION: LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE, 1977-78, 85 
(Michel Senellart ed., Graham Burchell tran., 2007).  
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and the operation of [. . .] normalization consists in trying to get people, movements, and actions to conform to this 
model, the normal being precisely that which can conform to this norm, and the abnormal that which is incapable of 
conforming to the norm. 
6 BASIA SPALEK, CRIME VICTIMS: THEORY, POLICY AND PRACTICE 14 (2006). 
7 INTEGRATING A VICTIM PERSPECTIVE WITHIN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL DEBATES, (Adam Crawford & Jo 
Goodey eds., 2000). 
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advocates.8 This development first occurred in North America and the United Kingdom (UK) and, 
later, in various other countries as well as internationally.9 The emergence of victim surveys 
(measuring the extent and nature of victimization) and academic interest in the characteristics of 
victimization (victimology) sustained a new attention toward victim harm.10 This focus, in turn, 
contributed to the rise of the victims’ rights movement which, since the 1980s, has tried to improve 
victims’ interaction with the criminal justice system and enhance therein the role of those affected by 
crime.11 Along with this “official” movement, victims’ protection became the objective of numerous 
sectorial action groups “formed around identities in relation to race, gender, sexuality, disability and 
so forth” (“single-issue” victim advocacy groups).12 Today, the victims’ rights movement is not 
homogeneous and, while in some countries victim advocates have not explicitly promoted punitive 
policies, in others (e.g. Austria, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, the US) they have at times expressed 
repressive impulses by conducting campaigns for harsher punishment or more incapacitating 
sentencing policy.13 This phenomenon occurred especially within single-issue victim advocacy 
groups, such as the women’s rights movement.14 As Elizabeth Bernstein observes, feminists in 
different countries have increasingly turned to “carceral politics” to protect rights concerning bodily 
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9 Ivo Aertsen, Punitivity from a Victim’s Perspective, in RESISTING PUNITIVENESS IN EUROPE 202, 210 (Sonja Snacken & Els 
Dumortier eds., 2012). 
10 Leslie Sebba, “Victim-Driven” Criminalisation? Some Recent Trends in the Expansion of the Criminal Law, in REGULATING 
DEVIANCE: THE REDIRECTION OF CRIMINALISATION AND THE FUTURES OF CRIMINAL LAW 59, 63 (Bernadette 
McSherry, Alan Norrie, & Simon Bronitt eds., 2009). 
11 Id. at 64. 
12 SPALEK, supra note 6, at 134. 
13 Aertsen, supra note 9, at 211; Sebba, supra note 10, at 66; MARKUS D. DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME: THE 
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in INTEGRATING A VICTIM PERSPECTIVE WITHIN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL DEBATES 185, 185–86 (Adam 
Crawford & Jo Goodey eds., 2000). 
14 Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741, 749–51 (2007); Dianne L. Martin, Retribution Revisited: A 
Reconsideration of Feminist Criminal Law Reform Strategies, 36 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 151, 168 (1998). 
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and sexual integrity.15 Activists in the US, India, and China, for example, have sought to criminalize 
domestic violence, usually encouraging mandatory arrest of offenders and no-drop prosecution.16 
Hate crime legislation is another area where the intersection of victims’ rights, human rights, and 
criminal justice has given rise to an expanded criminalization.17 
 While the proposals of victims’ organizations have been varied, they have mainly focused on 
reinforcing victims’ position in criminal proceedings.18 This process started in the 1980s at the 
domestic level, especially in the US with the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 and the adoption of 
“victims’ bills of rights” in several states of the Union.19 Then, it continued at the international 
level.20 Between 1983 and 1987, the Council of Europe implemented the European Convention on 
the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes (1983) and a series of recommendation for victims, 
including state compensation and assistance.21 In 1985, the UN published the Declaration of Basic 
Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (UN Victims’ Declaration) and in 
1999 produced the UN Handbook on Justice for Victims,22 while the European Union (EU) 
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of Europe, Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the Position of the Victim in the Framework of Criminal 
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adopted the Framework Decision on the Standing of Victims in Criminal Proceedings in 2001,23 
subsequently replaced by the Victim of Crime Directive in 2012.24 The Rome Statute and the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court (ICC) also codified a comprehensive 
list of victims’ rights in criminal proceedings.25 Thanks to these provisions and similar developments 
at the level of individual countries, today victims of crime have a far-reaching catalogue of 
fundamental rights in different stages of the criminal process, including participatory rights, right to 
receive information, and right to reparation.26 Discussion of victims’ rights within criminal 
proceedings has often been distinct from human rights discourse, although human rights law 
increasingly deals with the matter.27 Since late 1980, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) and the UN Human Rights Committee 
(UNHRC) have interpreted provisions on the rights to fair trial and to an effective remedy as 
providing victims’ rights within the criminal process.28 The recognition of victims’ rights has 
sometimes gone beyond procedural rights to grant substantive rights as well, including the right to 
have the offender prosecuted and punished by a court.29 
 Though not overlapping, victims’ rights and human rights have many points of contact.30 
First, certain crimes are also human rights violations and the category of “crime victim” may overlap 
 
23 EU, Framework Decision on the Standing of Victims In Criminal Proceedings, OJ L82 (2001). 
24 EU Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 Establishing 
Minimum Standards on the Rights, Support and Protection of Victims of Crime, and Replacing Council Framework 
Decision 2001/220/JHA, (2012). 
25 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted 17 July 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998), 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force 1 July 2002). 
26 JONATHAN DOAK, VICTIMS’ RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: RECONCEIVING THE ROLE OF THIRD 
PARTIES 115–58 (2008). 
27 Mykola Sorochinsky, Prosecuting Torturers, Protecting “Child Molesters”: Toward a Power Balance Model of Criminal Process for 
International Human Rights Law, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 157 (2009). 
28 Raquel Aldana-Pindell, An Emerging Universality of Justiciable Victims’ Rights in the Criminal Process to Curtail Impunity for 
State-Sponsored Crimes, 26 HUM. RTS Q. 605, 622–46 (2004). 
29 Fernando Felipe Basch, The Doctrine of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights regarding States’ Duty to Punish Human 
Rights Violations and Its Dangers, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV 195, 227–28 (2007). 
30 ELIAS, supra note 8, at 8; Sandra Walklate, Victims’ Needs, Rights and Justice, in THE ROUTLEDGE INTERNATIONAL 
HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 71 (Leanne Weber, Elaine Fishwick, & Marinella Marmo eds., 
2017). 
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with the category of “human rights victim.” For instance, violence against women and children, 
torture, enforced disappearance, and trafficking are all crimes as well as human rights abuses. 
Criminal victimization can be source of considerable suffering, not dissimilarly from human rights 
violations. In line with Robert Elias, we can consider certain crimes as violations of human rights, 
even though the perpetrator is a private individual and not the state.31 Second, the victims’ rights 
movement has developed in parallel with the emergence of the human rights movement32 and in 
several circumstances the two groups have coincided, such as in the case of the battered-women’s 
movement33 and the anti-trafficking campaigns.34 Today, several victim support activists describe 
their cause as a human rights campaign, by equating criminal victimization with human rights 
violations. While presenting their struggle in the language of human rights, these victim groups tend 
to turn away from social support and political struggle, and toward the promotion of criminal law.35 
Third, in some cases, international bodies have recognized victims of human rights abuses as victims 
of crime, although the abuses to which the latter were subject were not criminalized in their 
country.36 For instance, the UN Victims’ Declaration, implicitly referring to the wrongdoings 
committed in Latin America during the dictatorships, urges states to criminalize abuses of power 
and to provide remedies to victims of such abuses, as if they were victims of crime. Finally, victims’ 
rights rhetoric is akin to the human rights one. Both victim and human rights discourse tend to 
present victims (of either crimes or human rights abuses) as innocent and sympathetic, and opposed 
 
31 ELIAS, supra note 8, at 205, 208. 
32 ROBERT ELIAS, VICTIMS STILL: THE POLITICAL MANIPULATION OF CRIME VICTIMS 59–61 (1993). 
33 Lucy N. Friedman & Minna Shulman, Domestic Violence: The Criminal Justice Response, in VICTIMS OF CRIME: PROBLEMS, 
POLICIES, AND PROGRAMS 87 (Arthur J. Lurigio, Wesley G. Skogan, & Robert C. Davis eds., 1990). 
34 Bernstein, supra note 15. 
35 Elizabeth Bernstein, Militarized Humanitarianism Meets Carceral Feminism: The Politics of Sex, Rights, and Freedom in 
Contemporary Antitrafficking Campaigns, 36 SIGNS 45–71, 50 (2010). 
36 Sebba, supra note 10, at 67. 
9 
to evil and predatory offenders or perpetrators.37 The media spread images of insecurity, abuses, 
victimization and help create the trope of the “ideal-victim” that needs vindication for its suffering.38 
This ideal-victim is applied to a wide variety of human misfortunes, from ordinary crimes to human 
rights violations.39 It creates a “culture of victimhood”40 that is often used to support expanded 
penal policies and law-and-order thinking.41 
 Contemporary criminal justice discourses are soaked in the language of victims’ rights. This 
trajectory was not inevitable.42 In its early days, the victim movement was primarily concerned with 
the recognition of victims’ basic needs rather than with victims’ rights, by offering emotional 
support and assistance to victims as well as concentrating on the causes of abuses.43 Only in the 
1980s and 1990s has it become increasingly involved with promoting better provisions for victims 
within the terrain of criminal justice.44 At the time, the movement could question the ability of the 
criminal law in protecting victims’ needs and interests, while focusing on alternative, non-criminal 
responses to victimization. Rather, despite criticism of criminal justice institutions for being blind in 
respect of those affected by crime, victim support organizations designated the criminal law and its 
sanctions as the primary responses to victims’ suffering.45 The risk of “secondary victimization” 
deriving from the criminal justice system was not ascribed to the inability of criminal justice to 
provide social justice and victims’ restoration, but to the failure of the adversarial model (and, to a 
 
37 Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 HARVARD J. INT’L L. 201 (2001); DUBBER, 
supra note 13, at 3. 
38 JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 135 (2007). 
39 Aertsen, supra note 9, at 204. 
40 FRANK FUREDI, CULTURE OF FEAR: RISK-TAKING AND THE MORALITY OF LOW EXPECTATION (1997). 
41 DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001). 
42 Kent Roach, Four Models of the Criminal Process, 89 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 671, 715 (1999). 
43 DOAK, supra note 26, at 9. 
44 Id. at 9; ELIAS, VICTIMS STILL, supra note 32, at 52. 
45 Roach, supra note 42, at 705–06. 
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lesser extent, the inquisitorial model) to grant the victim effective participatory rights.46 By claiming 
that victims should be put at the heart of criminal justice, not only do victim activists lobby for a 
reform of the criminal justice system, but they also legitimize and endorse its expansion.47 Although 
many of victims’ expectations are said to be in the procedural sphere rather than in the achievement 
of a punitive outcome,48 reliance on criminal justice institutions means in practice their embrace at 
the expense of other, non-punitive, solutions.49 Even restorative measures are usually incorporated 
into the existing punitive framework.50 More victims’ rights do not automatically mean more 
punitiveness, but their indirect influence (both conceptual and rhetorical) can play a part and 
eventually result in expanded penality.51 As observed by Leslie Sebba, “victim-driven” 
criminalization has ultimately resulted in the inclusion of new offenses (e.g. stalking, sexual 
harassment, new forms of child abuse, hate crimes, holocaust denial, and human trafficking), the 
expansion of the scope of some existing crimes (e.g. rape) and compression of traditional defenses 
(e.g. self-defense and provocation).52 Governments may also use the rhetoric of victims’ rights to 
disguise policies that are primarily aimed at benefiting the interest of the state rather than the 
victims.53 This phenomenon has been labelled “populist punitiveness”54 or “penal populism”55 and 
involves expanding penality and curbing defendants’ due process rights by invoking better 
protection for victims.56 The state takes advantage of the request for more victims’ rights and 
 
46 Sebba, supra note 10, at 64. 
47 Roach, supra note 42, at 703. 
48 Aertsen, supra note 9, at 207. 
49 Gruber, supra note 14, at 800. 
50 Lucia Zedner, Reparation and Retribution: Are They Reconcilable?, 57 MODERN L. REV. 228 (1994). 
51 Aertsen, supra note 9, at 219; Sebba, supra note 10 at 65. 
52 Sebba, supra note 10, at 60. 
53 DOAK, supra note 26, at 11. 
54 Anthony Bottoms, The Philosophy and Politics of Punishment and Sentencing, in THE POLITICS OF SENTENCING REFORM 17, 
40 (Christopher M. V. Clarkson & Rod Morgan eds., 1995). 
55 JOHN PRATT, PENAL POPULISM (2007); NICOLA LACEY, THE PRISONERS’ DILEMMA: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND 
PUNISHMENT IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES 3–54 (2008). 
56 DUBBER, supra note 13. 
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citizens’ fear of crime to express increased penal control.57 As Markus Dubber puts it, “[i]t’s the very 
real suffering of personal victims of violent crime that justifies the state’s usurpation of ever greater 
powers of investigation and control.”58 
 To sum up, academics, criminal justice reformers, victim support activists, victim surveys, 
and the media have all played a role in making the victim of crime socially visible.59 Yet, the language 
of victims’ rights, intertwined with human rights discourse, has also become a “key vehicle both for 
the transnationalization of carceral politics and for folding back these policies into the domestic 
terrain in a benevolent [...] guise.”60 Victims’ rights discourse has played a role in legitimizing penality 
domestically and internationally and giving crime repression a “new and powerful human and rights-
bearing face.”61 But it has also contributed to reshaping the concept of crime as private matter of 
interpersonal violence as opposed to an offence against the public interest.62 This perspective, 
compared to the traditional state centered approach to criminal law, is also more consistent with the 
acceptance of a human rights framework. Criminal law, no longer the instrument to preserve solely 
public security and public interests, can now be used to secure victims from ordinary crimes, but 
also from atrocities and human rights violations. It turns into a tool of social reform and a 
protection for vulnerable individuals.63 
III. THE UPSURGE OF PENALITY IN THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT 
 
57 Peter Ramsay, The Theory of Vulnerable Autonomy and the Legitimacy of Civil Preventative Orders, in REGULATING DEVIANCE: 
THE REDIRECTION OF CRIMINALISATION AND THE FUTURES OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 10; SIMON, supra note 38 at 
96. 
58 DUBBER, supra note 13, at 6. 
59 Aertsen, supra note 9, at 203. 
60 Bernstein, Carceral Politics as Gender Justice, supra note 15, at 235. 
61 Roach, supra note 42, at 691. 
62 DUBBER, supra note 13, at 4. 
63 Augusto Jobim do Amaral, The Penal Policy of Human Rights, 1 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INTERNATIONALE 
STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK 61 (2013); MARIA LUCIA KARAM, RECUPERAR O DESEJO DA LIBERDADE E CONTER O PODER 
PUNITIVO 4 (2009). 
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In the last forty years, various bodies under the aegis of the UN have promoted a number of 
conventions, declarations, and other non-binding instruments expressing the idea that states ought 
to provide criminal justice mechanisms for serious breaches of human rights standards. Around the 
same time as the rise of victims’ rights at the national level, at the global stage the UN has been a key 
actor in promoting human rights and legitimizing their enforcement through criminal law. Efforts to 
set out state obligations to criminalize, prosecute, and punish human rights violations in 
international treaties might even be dated back to the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention), adopted in 1948 in the wake of the 
Second World War.64 However, the context of the postwar period, marked by the horror of the Nazi 
genocide and the Nuremberg trials, may explain the early drafting of this treaty.65 In addition, the 
Genocide Convention is not part of the UN human rights project, both because it focuses only on a 
too narrow situation and because it was originally presented in opposition to the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights (1948),66 passed the day after.67 
 Within the UN system, the first obligation to criminalize human rights breaches can be 
found in the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
adopted in 1965.68 Article 4 requires that states ‘declare an offence punishable by law’ various forms 
of hate speech and racial discrimination.69 The drafting of this article was deemed controversial at 
 
64 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted 9 Dec. 1948, G.A. Res. 260 (III), 
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/3/260 (1948), 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force 12 Jan. 1951) (entered into force 
for U.S. 23 Feb. 1989). 
65 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations in International Law, 78 
CALIFORNIA L. REV. 449 (1990). 
66 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 10 Dec. 1948, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/3/217A (1948). 
67 SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY 82 (2010). 
68 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted 21 Dec. 1965, G.A. Res. 
2106 (XX), U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/20/2106 (1965), 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force 4 January 
1969) (entered into force for U.S. 21 Oct. 1994) [hereinafter ICERD]. 
69 Id. art. 4. 
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the time and its adoption was criticized by a number of states.70 It was then the Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by the UN 
General Assembly (UNGA) in 1984, that marked the turn to criminal law in the UN human rights 
project.71 This convention is one of the first universal human rights treaties to set forth a duty for 
states to provide for effective criminal repression of serious wrongdoings by universal jurisdiction.72 
Article 4(1) obliges states to “ensure that all acts of torture are offences under [their] criminal law.”73 
Moreover, pursuant to Articles 5-7, state parties shall submit any case involving acts of torture to 
their competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, without any regard for the place of the 
commission of the acts, if suspects are in their territory and are not extradited. These provisions lay 
down the legal principle of aut dedere aut judicare, whose purpose is to ensure that no safe haven from 
criminal prosecution is granted to perpetrators of torture.74 Furthermore, the duty to institute 
criminal proceedings against alleged torturers appears to preclude state parties from passing amnesty 
laws that hinder such prosecutions.75 
 The Torture Convention represents a watershed in the promotion of criminal law for the 
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purpose of human rights protection.76 The principle of aut dedere aut judicare had previously been 
deployed almost exclusively outside the human rights framework. The Swedish Government, which 
proposed it, used as a model the corresponding provisions in a number of treaties against various 
forms of terrorism.77 The Torture Convention is also innovative with regard to the outcome that 
criminal proceedings for torture should have. Pursuant to Article 4(2), states are required to punish 
torture “by appropriate penalties which take into account their grave nature.”78 This implies a severe 
sentence.79 No previous human rights treaty had yet made mandatory that human rights violations 
be punished with harsh criminal penalties. Also, in this case, the drafting parties took enforcement 
provisions from anti-terrorist conventions and applied them to the Torture Convention, a human 
rights treaty.80 Although we might not find it strange, this drafting seemed unusual at the time. As 
Malcolm Evans has noted, many states, that had no difficulty in accepting jurisdictional and 
extradition obligations in the context of anti-terrorist conventions, nevertheless did not accept them 
easily in a convention that they perceived to be about human rights.81 
 Several examples following the adoption of the Torture Convention reflect an increasing 
concern on the part of the UN to make prosecution and punishment of gross human rights 
violations legally obligatory.82 In 1985, the UNGA unanimously adopted the UN Victims’ 
Declaration. This instrument calls on states “to enact and enforce legislation proscribing acts that 
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violate internationally recognized norms relating to human rights, corporate conduct and other 
abuses of power” and “to establish and strengthen the means of detecting, prosecuting and 
sentencing those guilty of crimes.”83 In 1989, the UN Economic and Social Council included 
obligations to investigate, prosecute, and punish human rights violations among the Principles on 
the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions.84 The 
duty to resort to criminal law measures against grave human rights abuses also appears in a number 
of international instruments drafted since the late 1980s and modelled on or inspired by the Torture 
Convention. These include the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture;85 the 
Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, adopted by the 
Eighth UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders in 1990;86 the 
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons From Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, 
adopted by the UNGA in 1992;87 the two Optional Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, respectively on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography (2000) and 
on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (2000),88 and the International Convention for 
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances (2006).89 
 In the same years, criminal law emerged as a necessary instrument of any UN human rights 
policy seeking to promote accountability and combat impunity. For instance, in 1993 the Vienna 
Declaration and Program of Action, arising from the UN World Conference on Human Rights, 
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urged states to “abrogate legislation leading to impunity for those responsible for grave violations of 
human rights such as torture and prosecute such violations, thereby providing a firm basis for the 
rule of law.”90 The UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities has also reiterated the same issue since 1991, when it requested Louis Joinet and El Hadji 
Guissé to undertake a study on the impunity of perpetrators of human rights abuses.91 The study 
was subsequently split in two parts and produced two reports concerning violations of civil and 
political rights and breaches of economic, social, and cultural rights, respectively.92 Joinet’s report, in 
particular, included a Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through 
Action to Combat Impunity (Joinet’s Principles), whose content was taken “note of” by the UN 
Commission on Human Rights in 1998.93  
 In 2003, the UN Secretary General invited Diane Orentlicher to update the Joinet’s 
Principles.94 In 2005, Orentlicher submitted the Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and 
Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity (UN Principles to Combat 
Impunity), which was endorsed by the UN Commission on Human Rights.95 By considering 
impunity as hindering the implementation of human rights and calling for the prosecution and 
punishment of human rights abuses,96 these principles have served as an important point of 
reference on debates on criminal accountability for human rights violations within and beyond the 
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UN.97 For instance, upon the influence of the UN Principles to Combat Impunity, in 2009 the 
Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly approved a recommendation on “The state of human 
rights in Europe: the need to eradicate impunity;”98 while in 2011 the Council of Europe’s 
Committee of Ministers adopted a series of guidelines titled Eradicating Impunity for Serious 
Human Rights Violations.99 The UN Principles to Combat Impunity emerged in parallel with 
another key UN document dedicated to state obligations, namely the Basic Principles on the Right 
to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law 
and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (the Van Boven/Bassiouni Principles).100 
Adopted by the UNGA in 2005, this instrument includes an obligation on states to punish human 
rights violations constituting international crimes, along with provisions on victims’ rights.101 
 In brief, in the last forty years, a wide array of activities of the UN and other 
intergovernmental organizations have promoted the view that criminal law plays a necessary part in 
protecting human rights.102 Following the adoption of the Torture Convention, there has been 
growing tendency to urge states to criminalize, prosecute, and punish serious human rights 
violations. 
IV. TRANSITIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
 
97 Haldemann & Unger, supra note 91,  at 15, 19; Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Principle 1. General Obligations of States to Take 
Effective Action to Combat Impunity, THE UNITED NATIONS PRINCIPLES TO COMBAT IMPUNITY, supra note 91, at 47, 51. 
98 Council of Europe (CoE), Recommendation of the Parliamentary Assembly—State of Human Rights in Europe: The Need to 
Eradicate Impunity, Rec. 1876 (2009). 
99 CoE, Eradicating Impunity for Serious Human Rights Violations (2011). 
100 UN General Assembly, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, Res 60/147, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/60/147 (2006), Annex (2005). 
101 Id. at 4. 
102 Orentlicher, supra note 75, at 2583. 
18 
The use of human rights in encouraging increased penality is also visible in the developments of 
transitional justice. Transitional justice has been defined as “the conception of justice associated with 
periods of political change, characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of 
repressive predecessor regimes.”103 By its very definition, it is concerned with accountability for 
human rights abuses of the past. Amongst many forms of accountability, criminal prosecution 
frequently figures as “the preferred choice.”104 Transitional justice is a field of scholarship, policy, 
and practice that began to emerge in the late 1980s.105 It is the result of a debate among human 
rights activists on how to deal with past violence in countries where democratic governments 
supplanted long-rooted dictatorships,106 following the “third wave of democratization” between 
1974 and 1990.107 An important contribution comes from the case of Argentina, where, with the end 
of the military dictatorship in 1983, the newly elected Raul Alfonsín tried to prosecute the junta’s top 
leaders.108 A commission of inquiry, convened by Alfonsín’s government, published a report on 
“disappearances” by state security forces. The judiciary conducted a series of trials. However, 
between 1986 and 1987, under pressure from the military, the government decided to terminate the 
prosecutions. A subsequent government passed an amnesty law for those sentenced to prison. 
Alfonsín’s project failed but it paved the way for a new debate among activists, scholars and 
policymakers concerned with human rights and “transitions to democracy.” A series of conferences 
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between the late 1980s and early 1990s marked the birth of the field of transitional justice.109  
 Transitional justice represents a further move from “naming-and-shaming” and toward 
criminal accountability among human rights activists.110 Until the mid-1980s, in addressing repressive 
governments, human rights organizations had rarely called for criminal accountability, since the 
power to conduct criminal trials was in the hands of the same leaders that were denounced.111 With 
the end of the Cold War and the collapse of oppressive regimes in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and 
Eastern Europe, a new attitude toward criminal law emerged, as no longer a source of abuses but as 
a way to remedy them. Once accountability for past wrongdoings became possible, human rights 
organizations did not hesitate to choose as a model the criminal legal system already in place for 
ordinary crimes. The recourse to criminal law was not debated but perceived as the obvious avenue 
for human rights enforcement.112 
 Given the deficiencies of most domestic legal systems involved in transitions, the source of 
an obligation to conduct criminal proceedings was looked for from within international law.113 
Orentlicher wrote that international human rights law required the prosecution and punishment of 
especially atrocious crimes.114 Carlos Nino responded that Orentlicher’s analysis failed to account for 
the complex factual context that successor governments may confront in deciding whether to 
conduct trials for human rights violations.115 Nino suggested that the urge for prosecution should be 
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counterbalanced with the aim of preserving the democratic system.116 Thus, in the early 1990s, the 
discussion revolved around the tension between punishment and political stability, between the 
demands of justice and the needs of a sustainable peace.117 In the words of José Zalaquett, 
“measures which are straightforward from the standpoint of human rights norms could have 
undesired political implications.”118 Even in this phase of transitional justice, the compatibility of 
criminal law with human rights was taken for granted. The discussion did not concern whether 
human rights required criminal accountability, but how much accountability and what compromises 
could be accepted during delicate political transformations.119 A number of countries recognized the 
dilemma between peace and justice and decided to forego criminal proceedings in favor of other 
methods of accountability.120 The South African experience is a prominent example. In 1995, South 
Africa established a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), whose purpose was, among 
others, to grant amnesty and extinguish criminal and civil liability for those who disclosed their 
wrongdoings during the apartheid period, if associated with a political objective.121 Called to decide 
upon the constitutionality of the TRC’s provisions, the South African Constitutional Court did not 
deny that perpetrators deserved punishment, but it saw amnesty as crucial to the aim of 
reconciliation.122 
 Over time, however, most human rights NGOs, courts, and scholars came to dismiss the 
tension between peace and justice, and criminal justice started being seen as complementary and no 
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longer in opposition to peace.123 The atrocities that occurred in the Balkans prompted the UN 
Security Council (UNSC) to establish the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY).124 The tribunal was supposed not merely to try the worst offenders, but also to contribute to 
reconciliation, create a historical record, and deter ongoing atrocities.125 Its mandate was “to impose 
justice before peace, and as a means to achieve peace.”126 The ICTY added an international 
dimension to transitional justice, leading the way for the establishment of other international 
institutions, including the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)127 and the ICC.128 The 
demand for more judicialization and institutionalization at the international level is to be seen as an 
attempt to relieve the tension between legal and moral obligations to punish and the need for 
political stability. International bodies are deemed to provide a neutral and apolitical response to 
chaotic local politics.129 They administer retributive justice in external settings (e.g. in The Hague) 
and in a supposedly impartial manner, through universal rules and procedure.130 They are also 
opposed to domestic political powers, seen as incapable of managing complex social problems, 
including the protection of human rights.131  
 The turn of the century marked what has been called the “justice cascade”132 or the 
“revolution in accountability”:133 individual criminal accountability by reference to human rights 
gained momentum and became an integral part of all international, regional, and national projects of 
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justice. The general perception was that a “new age of accountability” was replacing an “old era of 
impunity.”134 The dilemma between peace and justice became less relevant.135 Criminal justice had to 
be done, not only to hold perpetrators accountable, but also to report the truth and vindicate the 
victims.136 Two events in 1998 have been described as the trigger moments: the establishment of the 
ICC and the arrest of Chilean general and dictator Augusto Pinochet in London on a Spanish 
extradition warrant for torture and other human rights violations.137 For Naomi Roht-Arriaza, the 
latter event represented the most significant move toward a transnational fight for accountability, 
whereby leaders who committed gross abuses could no longer escape from prosecution and 
punishment for their actions.138 The Pinochet case gave practical effect to the Torture Convention 
and revitalized the principle of universal jurisdiction, namely the idea that courts of one country can 
hold foreign perpetrators criminally accountable for wrongdoings committed abroad. In recent 
years, human rights obligations have been invoked in the prosecution and punishment of various 
heads of state responsible for mass abuses, including former Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori, 
former Uruguayan president Juan María Bordaberry, and former Panamanian military dictator 
Manuel Noriega.139 Despite criticism,140 universal jurisdiction has gained increased relevance as a way 
to intervene and prevent impunity for human rights abuses.141 
 A recent debate involves the question of the legitimacy of amnesty laws under international 
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law and their persistence “in the age of human rights accountability.”142 In an earlier era, human 
rights advocates had often pleaded for amnesty for political prisoners.143 Conversely, today, 
amnesties are viewed with disfavor by those who believe that perpetrators of atrocities should be 
held criminally responsible for their acts.144 While, for a minority of authors, amnesties can still have 
a place in the international system as an effective tool for social reconciliation,145 most human rights 
NGOs, courts, scholars, and policymakers see amnesty laws as contrary to international law when 
they restrict duties to prosecute and punish mass abuses.146 Even the South Africa TRC experience is 
no longer regarded as a legitimate model. Juan Méndez wrote that, as a result of “the rapid evolution 
of international law,” today “the South African-style ‘conditional amnesty’” would be unacceptable 
“if it covered war crimes, crimes against humanity (including disappearances), or torture.”147 
 Nowadays, even though countries continue adopting amnesties, conducting sham trials, or 
undertaking selective prosecutions,148 legal doctrine and legal institutions at the international, 
regional, and local levels increasingly consider criminal accountability as the only legitimate option 
for addressing past atrocities. The duty to employ criminal law, justified through human rights law 
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and language, has become the new norm.149 Other non-punitive measures (truth commissions, fact 
finding inquiries, reparation programs, or limited amnesties) may still be used as pragmatic 
compromises, provided that they do not block criminal proceedings or jeopardize the call for 
criminal accountability.150 While a number of scholars and activists acknowledge the need of forms 
of structural accountability beyond prosecutions, they nonetheless keep placing the emphasis on 
criminal justice.151 There is a general sense that conducting more criminal trials in the aftermath of 
atrocities is beneficial for democracy and the rule of law, inasmuch as trials adhere to due process 
principles.152 Even those governments which otherwise would not have an interest in prosecution, 
are pushed toward criminal proceedings for past atrocities. In so doing, they incorporate the fight 
against impunity into their efforts to gain legitimacy and consolidate authority.153 
 The language of human rights is crucial in the enduring relevance of criminal-law 
mechanisms in transitional justice projects. The global crisis of the radical Left at the end of the 
1970s not only marked an ideological shift from political ideology and toward human rights,154 but 
also an abandonment of projects of radical social justice in favor of legal, institutional reforms aimed 
at defending the rights of individuals.155 State violence has been read in terms of human rights 
violations that require legalistic responses (especially prosecution and punishment of past leaders) 
rather than as an expression of class domination that mandates large-scale redistribution or a 
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profound transformation of society.156 Legalistic conceptions of rights and justice also dominate the 
field of transitional justice.157 Human rights are framed as legal standards that prioritize retributive 
notions of justice over political calls for forgiveness and reconciliation.158 Conversely, the absence of 
punitive measures is often regarded as a failure to uphold legal obligations which, in turn, paves the 
way to further violence.159 This approach has had two consequences. First, the prosecution of 
massive and systemic human rights abuses has conferred a legitimacy on criminal law that it could 
have never gained in addressing common crimes.160 Second, as Karen Engle has noted, “the 
correspondence between criminal prosecution and human rights has become so ingrained that 
expressing opposition to any particular international prosecution is sometimes seen as anti-human 
rights.”161 
V. PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
The history of international criminal law is often narrated as a triumphant story of human rights 
protection.162 The story begins with the failure of the international community to respond to mass 
violence for centuries. Then, for the first time with Nuremberg and Tokyo—the story goes—we 
succeeded to impose individual criminal responsibility for atrocities. Finally, after fifty years of 
impunity during the Cold War, the story culminates with the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals 
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and the ICC as the “stupendous achievement in the world community” for the protection of 
individual rights.163 However, international criminal law has not always been concerned with human 
rights. As Samuel Moyn observes, the Nuremberg Trials were primarily focused on aggression, while 
the Holocaust and other atrocities remained marginal.164 It was only in the 1990s that international 
criminal adjudication was reinvented as part of the human rights project and shifted its attention to 
accountability for human rights violations.165 
 Notwithstanding the above, the first international criminal tribunals after the Cold-War were 
not created for breaches of human rights law, but primarily for war-time atrocities. In 1993, the 
UNSC established the ICTY “for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.”166 The ICTR 
was created in 1994 “for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for genocide and other 
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda.”167 Yet, 
albeit primarily violations of the Geneva and Genocide Conventions, the mass atrocities committed 
in the Balkans and Central East Africa were also read in terms of human rights violations due to 
their universal moral repugnance.168 With the ICTY and the ICTR, the distinction between 
humanitarian law and human rights became increasingly blurred.169 Human rights law started being 
applied in armed conflicts and war crime trials became a new means to promote human rights.170 
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Because the Geneva Conventions laid down criminal accountability for grave breaches of 
humanitarian law, its application to other egregious abuses that appeared as compelling.171 
 The institutionalization of the ad hoc tribunals reinvigorated a long-standing interest in 
creating a permanent international criminal court.172 Not only would this court prosecute violations 
of humanitarian law in armed conflicts, but also gross human rights abuses occurred in peacetime.173 
A decisive impetus to the creation of the ICC came from global civil society. In 1995, a group of 
human rights NGOs created the Coalition for an International Criminal Court (CICC).174 In the 
following years, this advocacy network undertook a decisive activity of lobbying with state 
representatives, produced expert documents, organized conferences, distributed information, raised 
funds, and organized public demonstrations.175 A great push toward institution-building came also 
from women’s human rights activists who saw the ICC as an opportunity to expand the 
criminalization of sexual violence both in armed conflict and in peacetime.176 The Rome Statute was 
eventually adopted on 17 July 1998 and entered into force on 1 July 2002.177 The ICC was applauded 
as “a gift of hope to future generations, and a giant step forward in the march towards universal 
human rights and the rule of law.”178 Since then, the Court has been presented as the cornerstone of 
a broad human rights agenda, namely the “fight against impunity.”179 This emerges prominently 
from the Preamble of the Rome Statute, which refers to the determination to put an end to 
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“unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity.”180 The Court has also been 
entrusted “with almost mythical powers” including the management of transnational order and 
justice through criminal law.181 Yet, serious acts of violence are only captured through the lens of 
crimes.182 While human rights may be offered new prospects for enforcement through international 
criminal trials, the structural factors and socioeconomic injustices that contribute to human rights 
violations are systematically overlooked or reduced to “context”. 183 
 Initially, the widespread enthusiasm surrounding the ICC’s creation obfuscated the limits of 
international criminal process in delivering justice for mass atrocities.184 In the last decade, however, 
disenchantment and criticism have substituted the initial euphoria.185 Great expectations of justice 
have been left unfulfilled by reality. International criminal justice promised to deter crime, end 
conflict, and bring about justice.186 However, only a little part of this has been delivered. Atrocities 
have not been deterred and the majority of international crimes remain unpunished. The focus only 
on certain countries has fomented accusations of racism and neocolonialism.187 Victims have hardly 
found redress,188 while the defendant’s trial has been accused of embracing illiberal criminal 
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doctrine.189 Yet, the common explanation for the “crisis” of international criminal justice is either 
lack of state support or deficiency in effectiveness, due to inadequate investigations or poor decision 
making.190 In other words, the aspirations of international criminal justice have reportedly been 
frustrated because there is not (good) enough international criminal law. The general commitment to 
international criminal justice stands firm because—it is said—“[c]ertain things are simply wrong and 
ought to be punished.”191 Human rights NGOs, in particular, deeply rely on international 
prosecution in their fight for justice.192 The advocacy work of many of them is so much framed in 
the terms of international criminal justice that they devote more time in lobbying support for 
international criminal institutions than in monitoring states’ human rights compliance.193 There is 
also a different critique that questions the assumptions of international criminal law.194 For instance, 
some scholars have contended that not only are international criminal trials structurally incapable of 
addressing the socioeconomic causes of atrocities, but they also risk fostering other forms of 
impunity.195 However, the connection between human rights and international criminal law is rarely 
contested.196 Academics, practitioners, and NGOs, overwhelmingly agree that human rights are 
sources and raisons d'être of international criminal justice.197 Although prosecution of international 
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crimes may arguably raise threats to other human rights, especially defendants’ rights, it remains 
undisputed that international criminal law pursues to some extent a human rights cause.198 
 International criminal law is “a penal regime without a state, and more generally without a 
sovereign.”199 While domestic criminal law may find its normative legitimacy in the power of a 
central sovereign institution, international criminal law needs something else. Relying on a 
cosmopolitan approach, mainstream commentators argue that international criminal adjudication 
may rest on a value based order of humanity founded on “universal, indivisible and interculturally 
recognized human rights.”200 International criminal law also derives part of its sociological and 
political legitimacy from a politics of representation of those who suffer human rights violations.201 
Notably, victims and their “human rights entitlement to criminal justice” are one of the main 
justifying figures of the work of international criminal tribunals.202 These institutions invoke “the 
victim” as a means of backing the power they exercise, giving trials a human face, and showing why 
international criminal justice is valuable and needs financial support.203 Statute provisions and 
procedural rules on victims’ protection, participation, and reparation have reinforced this focus. The 
ICC, in particular, was created with the aim of being also a “victims’ court,” with the goal of giving 
voice and restoration to those who suffered as a result of mass violence.204 Exercising justice on 
victims’ behalf enables the action of international criminal tribunals but also places a high burden on 
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them, when they fail to provide effective justice.205 
 The fight to end impunity in international criminal law is not limited to prosecution in 
international fora. International criminal law purports also to pervade the domestic level, by 
encouraging national prosecution and the implementation of criminal law mechanisms against 
serious human rights violations. The jurisdiction of the ICC, for example, is based on the principle 
of complementarity.206 On the one hand, the Court has jurisdiction over international crimes when 
states are unwilling or unable to prosecute.207 On the other, states are induced to undertake effective 
criminal investigations and trials if they want to avoid the intervention of the ICC (positive 
complementarity).208 In this way, complementarity encourages “heterogeneity in terms of the 
number of institutions adjudicating international crimes, but homogeneity in terms of the process 
they follow and the punishment they mete out.”209 Moreover, while the 1990s was marked by a turn 
to international institutions on the assumption that domestic justice response would have been 
inadequate,210 in more recent years critiques and limitations of trials at the international stage have 
fostered the creation of tribunals that integrate both domestic and international structures.211 Hybrid 
and internationalized institutions include the Sierra Leone Special Court, the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, the Special Crimes Panels in Kosovo, followed by the 
Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, the Special Panels and Serious 
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Crimes Unit in East Timor, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the War Crimes Chamber in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, the Special Court in the Central African Republic, and the Extraordinary African 
Chamber.212 
 To conclude, as long as international criminal trials adhere to due process standards, 
international criminal law is considered “the most civilized response” to advance the human rights 
regime.213 For this reason, the same advocates of prisoners’ rights at the domestic level are often the 
most strenuous proponents of the desire to punish at the international level.214 International criminal 
law appears to fulfill a dual human rights mandate. It promotes fair trial and high standards of 
detention as models for national systems and it employs the preventive and retributive functions of 
criminal sentences to promote human rights standards. Whether international criminal law succeeds 
in these aims is another matter.215 
VI. THE PENAL POLICY OF HUMAN RIGHTS BODIES 
During the last three decades, the IACtHR, the ECtHR, the UNHRC and other human rights 
bodies have interpreted their mandate in monitoring compliance with international conventions as 
comprising the imposition of obligations to criminalize, prosecute, and punish human rights 
violations.216 These institutions increasingly rely upon human rights law to order states to ensure 
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criminal accountability at the domestic level, in a process that Alexandra Huneeus has defined as 
“international criminal law by other means.”217 The recourse to human rights instruments for 
enhancing criminal accountability is rooted in the doctrine of “positive obligations” and the theory 
of “horizontal applicability of human rights.”218 Since the 1980s, the traditional notion of human 
rights as freedom from state interference has shifted to a conception of rights that includes the state 
positive duty to remove barriers and ensure the full exercise of freedom.219 In addition, the growing 
awareness that mass abuses also originate from the conduct of private parties, other than the state, 
has resulted in an extension of human rights to relations between individuals. Today, wrongdoings 
committed by private actors may give rise to state responsibility if public authorities have failed to 
prevent them due to negligence or tolerance.220  
 The emergence of transitional justice in Latin America and Eastern Europe has also 
contributed to the development of case law on state obligations in criminal matters. Since the late 
1980s, victims of mass abuses, often supported by NGOs, have relied on human rights bodies to 
seek criminal accountability when domestic systems have failed to try and punish wrongdoings 
committed by authoritarian regimes or in the aftermath of civil conflicts.221 In Latin America, 
deficiencies in accountability and widespread impunity encouraged many victims to seek remedy 
before the Organisation of American States (OAS) institutions.222 In Europe, the ECtHR evolving 
case law on criminal accountability is also a response to Turkey’s and Russia’s failures in bringing 
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perpetrators to justice during and after the Kurdish and Chechnyan conflicts.223 
 In the context of the OAS, Velàsquez Rodríguez v Honduras is not only the first IACtHR 
decision in a contentious case, but also the leading case of the Court’s invocation of criminal 
accountability.224 The IACtHR found that states have a dual duty, namely to refrain from violations, 
but also to prevent, investigate, and punish them, regardless of whether state authorities are directly 
involved in the abuse.225 Yet, the OAS institution did not order Honduras to adopt criminal law 
measures as a remedy and acknowledged that “[t]he objective of international human rights law is 
not to punish those individuals who are guilty of violations.”226 Nonetheless, the authority of this 
statement did not last long. In the mid-1990s, the Inter-American Court started prescribing states to 
effectively punish individual perpetrators.227 Today, the IACtHR case law refers to the failure to 
deploy criminal sanctions as a violation of human rights per se. In cases of torture and enforced 
disappearance the duty to punish has even attained the status of jus cogens.228 
 The ECtHR has also developed a body of case law on state obligations in criminal matters.229 
The seminal case is X and Y v Netherlands.230 Here, the Court held that the “effective deterrence [that] 
is indispensable” to protect sexual integrity “can be achieved only by criminal-law provisions.”231 
Following this decision, the state duty to criminalize human rights abuses has been reiterated in the 
sphere of sexual life,232 but also with respect to the right to life,233 for cases of torture and inhuman 
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and degrading treatment,234 as well as for forced labor and human trafficking.235 Moreover, the 
ECtHR orders states to enforce their criminal law through “a thorough and effective investigation 
capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible.”236 The European 
Court has recently clarified that, in case of serious bodily harm, civil compensation is not enough 
and prosecution is required.237 Finally, the ECtHR has begun to demand severe punishment for 
serious human rights violations.238 In the view of the European Court, the duty to resort to criminal 
law would lose much of its meaning if perpetrators were punished with too lenient a sanction.239 
 The UNHRC, for its part, has developed a similar case law concerning the duty to institute 
criminal proceedings for the defense of human rights, including for arbitrary killing, enforced 
disappearance, torture and ill treatment, sexual and domestic violence, and human trafficking.240 
While in the 1980s the Committee merely required states “to bring to justice” those responsible for 
human rights violations,241 since the early 1990s the UNHRC has explicitly demanded prosecution 
and punishment.242 The UN Committee Against Torture  (UNCAT) is another human rights body 
that has consistently ordered states to investigate and punish acts of torture and ill treatment.243 
 From the jurisprudence of human rights bodies, criminal liability appears as an indispensable 
element of human rights protection, especially in cases of serious human rights abuses. The 
underlying rationales are mostly deterrence, prevention, and restoration of the rule of law.244 For 
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human rights bodies, criminal law safeguards society by ending impunity and providing general 
human rights protection. All human rights bodies have also a tendency to require criminal 
accountability in the interests of individual victims. The OAS bodies, in particular, have the most 
radical approach. Since the decision in Paniagua Morales et al v Guatemala,245 the IACtHR has had no 
hesitation in considering criminal justice as an instrument to protect the rights of the victims and 
give them restoration.246 For the Inter-American Court, prosecution and punishment ensure 
retrospective restoration of the infringed right but also enable the fulfilment of victims’ right to have 
the perpetrator properly tried and punished.247 In the jurisprudence of the UNHRC, criminal 
investigation and prosecution are also a necessary remedy for human rights violations.248 Yet, unlike 
the IACtHR, the Committee does not explicitly recognize victims’ right to the punishment of their 
offenders. In the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, criminal accountability is also at times deemed a 
measure of individual redress and satisfaction. In Al Nashiri v Romania and Abu Zubaydah v Lithuania, 
for instance, the ECtHR held that “the notion of an ‘effective remedy’” for the victim entails 
criminal proceedings “leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible.”249 
 In the jurisprudence of the IACtHR, the duty to deploy criminal sanction is absolute. The 
Court has often declared of no legal effect measures that frustrate criminal justice, including amnesty 
laws, statutes of limitations, the principle of non-retroactivity, and the prohibition against double 
jeopardy.250 Notably, opposition to amnesty appears entrenched in the OAS bodies’ case law.251 
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Since Barrios Altos v. Peru,252 the IACtHR has extended the ban from self-amnesty laws to every 
amnesty shielding human rights abuses, regardless of their nature, origin, and purpose.253 Even 
amnesties upheld by popular referenda254 or aimed at promoting peace and reconciliation255 have 
been found inadmissible.256 Aversion to the state’s use of amnesty is also visible in the case law of 
other human rights bodies. To date, the ECtHR has admitted that amnesties for serious human 
rights abuses might be acceptable in exceptional circumstances,257 whereas the UNHRC has imposed 
an absolute ban on amnesties shielding gross human rights violations.258 Both UNCAT259 and the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights260 have adopted a similar position. 
 The case law on state obligations in criminal matters has had a considerable impact on 
domestic legal systems. Pursuant to human rights bodies’ decisions, states have started new criminal 
investigations, overturned amnesties, introduced new offenses, and created new institutions to 
facilitate prosecution.261 In Simón, Julio Héctor y Otros, for instance, the Argentinian Supreme Court 
relied on the IACtHR case law to exclude the application of amnesty, statutory limitations, and the 
legality principle.262 In Italy, following a ECtHR decision, the Parliament approved a bill which 
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aimed to introduce the crime of torture in the Italian Criminal Code.263 In the UK, ECtHR case law 
on state obligations to criminalize labor exploitation influenced the adoption of the Modern Slavery 
Act 2015.264 
 To sum up, the case law of human rights bodies has evolved over time toward viewing 
criminal justice as a necessary means to promote and safeguard human rights. For some 
commentators this development is to be welcomed.265 Others, on the contrary, have argued that an 
expanded criminalization by means of human rights law may weaken the traditional commitment to 
the rights of the defendant,266 enhance state coercive power,267 or promote a “culture of 
conviction.”268 Either way, criminal punishment has become one of the main objectives of human 
rights law. An in-depth analysis of human rights bodies’ case law shows a tendency to assume an 
outright obligation to employ criminal law mechanisms. This obligation appears as something self-
evident that needs no serious assessment concerning its practical and theoretical implications.269 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Prince Mohammed Bin Salman is still ruling Saudi Arabia, but the human rights movement is not 
sitting on its hands. In June 2019, the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or 
Arbitrary Killings, Agnès Callamard, submitted to the UN Human Rights Council her final report of 
a human rights inquiry into the killing of Jamal Khashoggi.270 First, the Special Rapporteur found 
that Saudi Arabia bears responsibility for the extrajudicial killing of the journalist, in violation of the 
right to life, the prohibition against enforced disappearance, the protection of freedom of expression 
and, probably, the prohibition of torture. Second, she maintained that Saudi Arabia and Turkey have 
failed to comply with the positive obligation to investigate Khashoggi’s killing, and that Saudi Arabia 
has also violated its duty to prosecute human rights violations and provide reparation to the 
journalist’s family. Third, relying on a possible violation of the Torture Convention, she found that 
Khashoggi’s murder constitutes an international crime over which states should claim universal 
jurisdiction. Finally, the Special Rapporteur called on various UN bodies to initiate an international 
criminal investigation into Khashoggi’s death and, possibly, establish an ad hoc or hybrid tribunal for 
providing judicial accountability. 
*** 
 While the traditional understanding of human rights is to restrain state authority to prevent 
abuses against the individual, in the last few decades human rights have been recast in a way that has 
made criminal law one of the main instruments for their promotion. Since the 1970s, human rights 
have allowed penal power to move across borders and, through the interactions among different 
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actors, norms, and law levels, they have shaped penal policies around the world. In many countries, 
the language of victims’ rights, at times combined with human rights discourse, has become a vehicle 
for the legitimation of criminal law measures. The same language has also played a key role in 
justifying a new focus of international criminal law on atrocities and human rights bodies’ recourse 
to criminal justice. Furthermore, since the adoption of the Torture Convention, a number of 
international instruments adopted under the aegis of the UN have prescribed criminal law 
mechanisms for breaches of human rights standards. These instruments have been invoked to foster 
accountability for human rights abuses of past regimes when many countries around the world 
began their transition to democracy at the end of the Cold War. Finally, human rights bodies have 
assumed criminal law obligations under human rights conventions. In so doing, not only they have 
complemented the role of international criminal tribunals in enforcing human rights through 
criminal justice, but they have also encouraged states to deploy their domestic criminal system to 
counter impunity.  
 Driven by the universality of human rights discourse, criminal justice projects have expanded 
over time and across spaces, mixing domestic and international elements. Victims’ rights advocates, 
NGOs, academics, judges, policymakers, and other state and non-state actors have been involved in 
this process. While deployed to protect human rights, penality has been strengthened, defended, and 
justified. In what may appear as a paradox, rather than moderating state penal policies, the more 
human rights have permeated conceptions of justice around the globe, the greater has been the 
dissemination and legitimation of punitive responses. The expansion of penality by reference to 
human rights has been welcomed almost universally with few critical voices raised and limited 
serious debate. It has been normalized. Yet, we have become accustomed to requiring penal action 
for human rights abuses without interrogating what is involved in the relationship between two 
bodies of law, as human rights, and criminal law, that are at once very different but entangled. It is 
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now time to explore this taken-for-granted relationship to expose the assumptions that lie behind it 
and the interests it supports. 
 
 
